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PRIVATE LAW
PERSONS
Robert A. Pascal*
[Author's note: The editors of the Review having requested
that comments on decisions of the year under review be selec-
tive and brief, the discussion below has been limited mainly,
though not entirely, to decisions chosen from among those con-
sidered by the writer to be at variance with the legislation.]
DoMIcILz OF THE MARRIED WOMAN
Under what circumstances, if any, may a married woman
have an intrastate or interparish domicile different from her
husband's? Article 39 of the Civil Code, long the only legisla-
tion on the subject, says no more than "a married woman has
no other domicile than that of her husband." It does not admit
of exceptions, not even one for the married woman separated
from bed and board. For decades, nevertheless, the jurisprudence
has held that the married woman may have a separate domicile
after separation from bed and board or even before if her
husband has given her cause justifying her living separate from
him, and under R.S. 9:301 as it stood before 1960 it was implied
that the wife living separate and apart under such circumstances
as would warrant divorce under that legislation could have a
separate domicile. Now article 3941 of the new Code of Civil
Procedure, enacted in 1960, implicitly acknowledges that before
a judgment of nullity, separation, or divorce a married woman
may have a domicile other than her husband's, for it specifies
that suits for annulment, separation or divorce may be brought
at the domicile of either or at the last matrimonial domicile.
For this reason alone the statement in Consolidated Loans, Inc. v.
Guerico' is most certainly in error, for it declares the "married
woman not judicially separated from her spouse can have no
domicile other than that of her husband." On the other hand,
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 200 So.2d 717 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
[312]
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the statement in Landry v. Landry,2 that unless the husband has
given the wife cause for separation from bed and board she
cannot have a domicile separate from his, conforms to the long-
standing jurisprudence pronounced in spite of article 39 of the
Civil Code; but it does not encompass the implication of R.S.
9:301, as it stood before 1960, and certainly it does not reflect
the possibly broader implication of article 3541 of the Code of
Civil Procedure that in any case husband and wife may have
separate domiciles. Clarification through legislation would be
helpful. The writer suggests, nevertheless, that in the light of the
change in law implicit in R.S. 9:301 as it stood before 1960, which
change certainly was very drastic, article 3941 may be inter-
preted to have been intended to mean that the husband and wife
may have separate domiciles whenever they in fact live separate
and apart.
SEPARATON FROM BED AND BOARD
The most important decision on the causes for separation
from bed and board was Sciortino v. Sciortino.8 Article 138 of
the Civil Code was amended in 1956 to allow separation from
bed and board "when the husband and wife have voluntarily
lived separate and apart for one year." In applying this cause
the judiciary had not required the living separate and apart to
be by mutual agreement, but had accepted living separate and
apart by unilateral action. In Sciortino the court decided the
words of the legislation demand that the separation have been
by mutual consent, as the writer had suggested in 1956.4 It is
unfortunate that R.S. 9:301 and its antecedent legislation were
not similarly construed from the start so as to deny divorces
where the living separate and apart was not by mutual consent.
This legislation as presently interpreted is comfort and assurance
to an abandoning spouse that he or she will be able to obtain
a divorce whether or not the loyal spouse wishes a move in that
direction and even against that spouse's opposition.5
ALIMONY AFTER DIVORCE
Article 160 of the Civil Code as amended in 1960 (pursuant
to recommendations of the Louisiana State Law Institute) reads
2. 192 So.2d 237 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
3. 188 So.2d 224 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), writ denied, 190 So.2d 237
(1966), on the basis of "no error of law."
4. Pascal, Legislation Affecting the Civil Code and Related Subjects, 17
LA. L. Rsv. 22, at 23, 24 (1956).
5. Complementing Sciortino is Jardes v. Jardes, 191 So.2d 645 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1966), which declares that a separation by mutual consent is not an
abandonment.
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that after divorce the wife may claim alimony if she "has
not been at fault." In Gamino v. Gamino6 the wife had obtained
a separation from bed and board for the cause of abandonment
and a year later had obtained a divorce on showing non-
reconciliation in that time. Against the wife's claim for alimony
the husband introduced evidence probative of the wife's fault
in disrupting the common life. The lower court ruled the separa-
tion judgment res judicata as to the cause for the separation,
and therefore of the fault of the husband and non-fault of the
wife for the purpose of applying Article 160. The majority of
the court of appeal held, both originally and on rehearing, that
the separation judgment was not determinative of the wife's
freedom from fault. The dissenting opinion of Judge Chasez
demonstrates the inconsistency of the decision with the legis-
lation and its background and there is no need to labor the
matter here. There can be little doubt the court believed the
wife had deceived the court in the separation suit, and one is
compelled to wonder whether the majority of the court per-
mitted this fact to obscure its appreciation of the applicable
legislation. Be that as it may, it may be predicted that if this
construction of article 160 prevails suits for separation on the
ground of abandonment will be used to obtain immediate separa-
tions where legal cause does not exist and without prejudice to
either party on the issue of alimony after divorce. This in itself
should be indication enough the legislation was not intended to
have the meaning assigned to it by the court.
WAIVER OF FUTURE RIGHT TO ALIMONY
In Nelson v. Walker7 the Supreme Court uttered dictum
which may have serious implications. The Court of Appeal for
the First Circuits had declared null a partition of community
assets containing a waiver of future alimony on the grounds
that, among others, (1) the right to alimony in the future was
not alienable and (2) the waiver so much formed an integral
part of the partition that the latter could not be upheld indepen-
dently of it. The Supreme Court reversed the decision declaring
the waiver of alimony in any event not a major element in the
partition, which therefore might be upheld without it. The object
of the suit being the validity of the partition agreement as a
6. 199 So.2d 202 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
7. 250 La. 545, 197 So.2d 619 (1967).
8. Nelson v. Walker, 189 So.2d 54 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
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division of former community assets, and not in any way a claim
for alimony, the court could have stopped there and not dis-
cussed the validity of the alimony waiver. It went on, never-
theless, but therefore by way of dictum rather than necessary
decision, to declare obliquely (a) that the right to claim alimony
in the future was one which might be alienated or waived by
one not under a contractual incapacity or disability and more
directly (b) that although the alimony waiver in the particular
instance was null at the time it was entered into because of an
(alleged) disability of husband and wife under article 1790
of the Civil Code to contract with each other during marriage
except in instances affirmed by law, this (alleged) nullity was
relative rather than absolute, therefore ratifiable once the cause
of the disability ceased to exist, and in fact had been ratified
after the divorce of the parties.
The writer, in spite of a long jurisprudence on the point,
denies that article 1790 declares husband and wife generally
without power to contract with each other during marriage.
The text of article 1790 states, on the contrary, that this and
other disabilities mentioned therein "take place only in the
cases specially provided by law, under different titles of this
Code." The jurisprudence to the contrary, therefore, is invalid.9
Much more serious, however, is the conclusion that the right to
claim alimony in the future under the general law on the subject
might be waived as one established in favor of the person
rather than for purposes of public order. No doubt other juris-
dictions do permit such waivers, but it is submitted that alimony
law is a matter of public order. It is one of the ways through
which the societal obligation to provide for the support of those
in need is distributed. Certainly those in need and not provided
for by individual alimony obligors must be provided for from
general funds. It is of the utmost importance therefore that the
obligor not be permitted to contract with the potential dependent
to obtain relief from his potential future obligation. The depen-
dent not presently in need might be induced to waive his future
right in return for a present gain only to find later that he is
much in need and must seek relief from public sources. There
may be much validity, too, to the argument advanced but not
answered in an alimony case some years ago: if alimony is not
9. See the mention of this in last year's Symposium discussion, 27 LA.
L. REv. 459 (1967) at note 14.
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in the public interest, then to order anyone to pay alimony to
another amounts to taking private property for private use.10
CRITERION FOR AMOUNT OF ALIMONY
Alimony to the wife after divorce is limited under article
160 of the Civil Code to one-third of the husband's income,
though once reduced to a judgment obligation it may be enforced
as any other out of any of the husband's assets. Alimony to
ascendants and descendants, however, is measured only by the
"wants" or needs of the dependent and the "circumstances" of
those who are to pay it. Sanders v. Sanders" in effect construed
"circumstances" to mean capital as well as income and accord-
ingly awarded alimony in favor of children, even though their
father was unemployed, on the basis of his having assets worth
$16,500.
Filiation
Hibbert v. Mudd'2 held that nothing in Louisiana legislation
authorizes the acknowledgment of miscegenous children. Be
that as it may, the question has since become of no importance.
Under the recent United States Supreme Court decision in
Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia" it seems certain that
all laws discriminating among persons on the basis of race
must be considered contrary to the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution.
Consistent with prior jurisprudence, but inconsistent with
the legislation, is the decision in Succession of Barlow. 4 A mar-
ried woman conceived and gave birth to a child while living
in open concubinage with a married man. After dissolution of
their respective marriages, the adulterous parents married each
other, acknowledged the child, and reared him as their own.
It was argued that under article 198 of the Civil Code the
adulterous child is legitimated by the marriage of its parents
and their acknowledgment of him. The court agreed this was
true, but declared article 198 inapplicable. The rationale of the
court was that under article 184 and following the child was
not the adulterous illegitimate offspring of the couple, but rather
10. See Hays v. Hays, 240 La. 708, 124 So.2d 917 (1960).
11. 250 La. 588, 197 So.2d 635 (1967).
12. 187 So.2d 503 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
13. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
14. 197 So.2d 682 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
[Vol. XXVIII
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by conclusive presumption of law the legitimate child of the
mother and of her husband at the time of its conception. Thus
once more the judiciary refused to recognize that article 184
and following are not applicable merely because the mother
is a married woman. Here, as the child was born in concubinage,
the paramour is presumed to be its father under article 209
of the Civil Code. Under these circumstances there was no need
for the husband of the mother to disavow the child and, had
the child himself claimed the mother's husband to be his father,
anyone at interest could have shown him to be the child of
another man under article 197 of the Civil Code. The juris-
prudence's misapplication of articles 184 and following has
offered the color of legitimate birth to children even when the
obvious facts, and more rational constructions of the law, were
to the contrary. The writer submits these articles were never
intended to impose legitimate filiation and all its liabilities
on the husband of the mother when illegitimate paternity of
the child was not in reasonable doubt under other presumptions
of law.15
Custody, Paternal Authority, and Tutorship
Under the juvenile welfare legislation, administered in the
juvenile courts only, the custody of a child surrendered for
adoption, abandoned, neglected, or delinquent may be disposed
of without reference to the civil legislation. Under the civil
legislation, however, which alone may form the basis of pro-
ceedings in the civil courts, custody is an integral part of the
law on paternal authority and tutorship. Thus it must be affirmed
that under the civil legislation, and therefore in all actions for
custody in the civil courts, the right to the custody of an
unemancipated minor can be determined lawfully only with
* reference to the legislation on paternal authority and tutorship.
For this reason the proceedings in Murtishaw v. Brady'8 and
State ex rel. Bannister v. Bannister 7 must be considered to have
been initiated irregularly. In Murtishaw the effort was that of
a grandmother to obtain custody of a child detained by its
stepmother after death of the father. The stepmother not being
tutrix, the suit should have been one to claim the tutorship of
15. The reasoning of Cardozo, C. J., in construing similar New York
legislation might be emulated with more justice. See Matter of Findlay, 253
N.Y. 1, 170 N.E. 471 (1930).
16. 191 So.2d 698 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
17. 198 So.2d 196 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
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the child. In Bannister the situation was similar except that the
stepmother already had been appointed dative tutrix and hence
the proceedings should have been to remove the tutrix and
appoint another. On the contrary, however, these suits were both
improperly initiated as habeas corpus proceedings which, under
article 3821 of the Code of Civil Procedure, may be used only
to determine the authority of the respondent to detain the
person in question. In Bannister, the habeas corpus suit should
have ended once the respondent proved she was dative tutrix;
and in Murtishaw it could have been shown the stepmother
was not tutrix and therefore not entitled to custody, but the
relator's right to custody was not properly before the court.
It is proper, of course, for one having an established right to
custody of a child as parent or tutor to initiate habeas corpus
proceedings against third persons detaining the child without
right. In this respect the habeas corpus proceeding in Hoffpauir
v. Meche s was used correctly by the relator-tutrix to recover
the child from her husband, who had detained her unlawfully;
but it was improper for the court, after ascertaining that the
relator was tutrix of the child, to hear other evidence and "award
custody" of the child to the detaining father. The child should
have been returned to its tutrix-mother. Then, should the father
have believed grounds to exist, he might have filed suit for
removal of the tutrix and appointment of himself or another
as tutor.
The present practice of the judiciary of considering custody
as a matter which might be awarded without reference to the
institutions of paternal authority and tutorship must have de-
veloped out of practices once proper under legislation now
repealed. First, from Act 79 of 1894 until the repeal of R.S.
9:551-553 by Act 111 of 1956 the civil courts enjoyed a jurisdic-
tion similar to that now exclusively in the juvenile courts and
accordingly could consider the custody of a child without refer-
ence to paternal authority or tutorship if its neglect or other
causes seriously endangered its physical, moral, or mental wel-
fare. But the civil courts have not had this authority since 1956.
Only the juvenile courts have it. Secondly, until 1924, because
paternal authority continued after separation from bed and
board, article 157 of the Civil Code permitted the custody of the
child to be either settled amicably or awarded judicially to one
of the spouses, and there was the possibility of simple custody
18. 180 So.2d 281 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
1968] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1966-1967 319
proceedings between husband and wife. Today, however, since
the amendment of articles 157, 246, and 250 in 1924,19 separation
as well as divorce terminates paternal authority, the separated
and divorced spouses do not have the right to "determine custody"
amicably, the court should in every instance give the custody of
the child to one of the parents, and that parent "shall of right
[i.e., as a matter of law] become tutor" of the child.20 From this
point on, the initial award of custody after separation or divorce,
the matter is one of tutorship. Accordingly, proceedings to change
custody after the initial award following separation or divorce
are tutorship proceedings, to be conducted as such under the
substantive and procedural laws on tutorship.21 Thus in Lucas v.
Lucas22 the proceedings were entirely irregular. After award of
custody, and therefore tutorship to the mother and removal of
her domicile to Mexico, the father abducted the child to Lou-
isiana and there initiated proceedings for the child's custody.
Under Louisiana legislation the only proper proceeding would
have been in Mexico, at the domicile of the mother and child.28
In the writer's opinion the court should have dismissed the
father's suit, returned the child to the mother-tutrix on her
demand, and compelled the father to follow the authorized pro-
cedure for removal of the tutor and appointment of another
by filing his suit at the domicile of the mother-tutrix. 4 Similar
observations might be made on the proceedings in Ranson v.
MitchellJ2 5 and Duplantis v. Bueto,26 in each of which the exist-
ence of a tutorship was ignored.
Minor's Delicts
Not patently erroneous is the decision in Guidry v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,27 according to which the father, though
19. By La. Acts 1924, Nos. 74, 72, and 196, respectively.
20. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 157 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1924, no. 74.
21. See the author's discussion of this subject in Symposium, 27 LA. L.
REv. 432-34 (1967).
22. 195 So.2d 771 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967), writ denied.
23. LA. CODE OF CIvIL PROCEDURE art. 4034 (1960); compare id. arts. 4031,
4032.
24. The court of appeal reasoned that because article 10(5) of the Code
of Civil Procedure asserts Louisiana courts may entertain custody proceed-
ings as to a child present in the state, the Louisiana court might proceed
as it did. In the writer's opinion the court failed to distinguish between the
general power to hear custody cases, which Article 10(5) claims for the
State and its judiciary, and the nature of the case at hand, which was in
essence one for the change of the tutor.
25. 193 So.2d 359 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
26. 186 So.2d 424 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
27. 201 So.2d 534 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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divorced from the mother, is liable for delicts of a minor living
with the mother without a formal award of custody (and there-
fore tutorship under article 157 of the Civil Code) to her. The
reasoning of the court was that inasmuch as the child had not
been placed in the custody of one or the other parent by judicial
decree paternal authority had not been terminated, and during
paternal authority the father is liable for the minor's delicts.
The writer does not believe that paternal authority can be said
to continue after separation or divorce, but there is a lacuna
in our legislation on liability for a minor's delicts between the
dates of a separation or divorce and the award of the minor's
custody to one of the parents. Article 2318, which renders the
father while living, and after his death the mother, liable for
the minor's delicts, became part of our law when divorce was
unavailable except by special legislative act and separation from
bed and board did not terminate paternal authority. Since the
enactment of divorce legislation in 182828 and 183029 and in
article 246 of the Revised Civil Code of 1870, divorce has termi-
nated paternal authority; but it was only with the amendment
of articles 157, 246, and 250 of the Civil Code in 192480 that
separation from bed and board was given the effect of terminat-
ing paternal authority. There can be no doubt of this, however,
for after the rendition of a separation or divorce decree neither
parent, as parent, has any right in law to represent or have
custody of the child; only on being given custody by judicial
decree does a parent have tutorship of the child and therefore
the right to represent him and to have his custody. Neverthe-
less, it may not be said that paternal authority continues during
that period, for article 246 of the Civil Code declares that minors
are subject to tutorship after separation or divorce of their
parents. The writer suggests that the judiciary might have
filled the lacuna better by holding the parent with actual custody
liable as if awarded custody by decree, for if such custody had
been decreed, that parent would have been tutor and liable.
A decision clearly distinguishable from the preceding is that
in Tripoli v. Gurry.31 The mother had been given custody after
judgment of separation from bed and board, and the subsequent
divorce judgment made no mention of custody. The court ruled,
and very correctly, that the mother was tutrix in spite of her
28. La. Acts 1828, No. 36.
29. La. Acts 1830, p. 48, § 9.
30. La. Acts 1924, Nos. 74, 72 and 196.
31. 187 So.2d 540 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
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having failed to qualify as such and liable for the child's delict
committed after the divorce. Articles 157, 246, and 250 do not
permit of any other conclusion. The language of article 157 is
particularly strong: the parent given custody "shall of right
[i.e., as a matter of law] become natural tutor or tutrix to the
same extent and with the same effect as if the other party had
died."
One more decision relating to parental and tutorial liability
for minors' delicts must be mentioned. In Williams v. City of
Baton Rougen2 it was held that a father would be held liable
for the delict of his child committed in the course of employ-
ment by a third person. The court's rationale was that the
parent is responsible vicariously as long as the minor is "residing
with him," citing article 2318 of the Civil Code, 3 as long as
the employer has not required the delictual act on the part of
the minor. Yet the decision acknowledges that the jurisprudence
has declared parents not liable when the minor has committed
a delict while on active duty with the armed forces or a posse
comitatus, though "residing with" the parents at the time, and
apparently even when the delict has not been committed under
orders of the authorities in question. The writer admits that the
legislation, article 2318, does not by its language admit of excep-
tions to parental liability to the parties affected for delicts of
minors residing with them, but submits that, in any event,
there is insufficient basis for distinguishing between the delicts
of a minor on active duty with the armed forces or a posse
comitatus and one civilly employed.34 Beyond this, however,
it must be observed that whereas under article 2318 parents or
tutors are liable to the victims for delicts of minors "placed
by them under the care of other persons," this liability is only
to the victims, and the parents may have "recourse against
those persons" to whom they had entrusted the minor's dare.
If this is so, it would seem that, by analogy, the parents of an
employed minor should at least be able to recover from the
minor's employers for a delict committed in the course of the
32. 200 So.2d 420 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
33. The court also quoted from Watkins v. Cupit, 130 So.2d 720 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1961), an excerpt which quotes a portion of 2 PLANIOL, TRAITh
nILEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL (nos. 909-910), which contains much language
quite inapplicable in Louisiana because of the differences between the French
and Louisiana legislation on the subject.
34. The present form of article 2318 dates from 1825. Under the Digest
of 1808, 3.4.20, parental and tutorial responsibility are not vicarious, but
personal, attaching only when the parent or tutor has been negligent in
surveillance of the minor or when the minor has acted in his presence.
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employment. And even beyond this, the writer suggests parental
and tutorial responsibility under article 2318 very logically may
be considered not to attach when liability of the master or
employer exists under article 2320 of the Civil Code. These
liabilities would seem to be exclusive of each other. Each
instance of vicarious liability exists for the protection of the
victims, and if the victims of delicts by majors are sufficiently
covered by the vicarious liability of the master or employer,
there would seem to be no reason in law for the simultaneous
liability of the parents or tutor for a minor's delicts.
RECOGNITION OF SISTER-STATE AND FOREIGN DIVORCES
Ever since the United States Supreme Court decision in
William v. North Carolina 135 the ostensible rule has been that
a divorce, rendered in a sister-state or a United States territory
in which the plaintiff was then domiciled and otherwise valid,
is entitled to full faith and credit whether or not the defendant
was before the court in the procedural sense; and a divorce
rendered in a state in which the plaintiff was not domiciled
may on proof of that fact be denied recognition 36 unless the issue
of domicile itself has become res judicata under standards
declared or implicit in later United States Supreme Court deci-
sions. More particularly, the United States Supreme Court has
said the issue of the plaintiff's domicile is res judicata if the
defendant appeared in the suit and either litigated7 or admitted 8
it, or, in Johnson v. Muelberger,39 even if the defendant had
neither litigated nor admitted the plaintiff's domicile, but had
been served personally in the forum state. Furthermore, under
Johnson v. Muelberger, not only the parties, but also strangers
to the proceeding, are barred from attacking the divorce judg-
ment for lack of the plaintiff's domicile at the forum if under
the forum state's law of res judicata the issue cannot be raised
by him or her. All of these criteria appear to have been con-
firmed later in Cook v. Cook.40
It is in the context of the above-mentioned United States
Supreme Court decisions and one other, to be mentioned later,
that the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Boudreaux v.
35. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
36. Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
37. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
38. Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
39. 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
40. 342 U.S. 126 (1951).
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Welch 4' must be appraised. The wife, domiciled in Louisiana,
filed suit for divorce in Mississippi. The husband, also domiciled
in Louisiana, filed a "waiver of service and entry of appearance"
in the suit, as authorized by Mississippi legislation. On the day
after the judgment of divorce the wife remarried. Later her
second husband was killed and she sued for wrongful death.
The defendant attacked the validity of the marriage to the
decedent by pleading the nullity of the Mississippi divorce. At
the wrongful death trial the wife admitted she had not been
domiciled in Mississippi at the time of the divorce. On these
facts the court of appeal 42 declared the Mississippi divorce not
entitled to full faith and credit, the issue of domicile not having
become res judicata by reason of the absence of any "adversary
proceeding" in which the defendant could have raised and liti-
gated it. The Supreme Court reversed. The majority noted that
the parties were before the court procedurally according to
Mississippi law, that the defendant therefore had had an oppor-
tunity to litigate the issue of domicile, and that the judgment
could not be attacked by anyone in Mississippi, and that for
these reasons they believed themselves bound to give full faith
and credit to the divorce under the United States Supreme Court
decision in Johnson v. Muelberger. Justice Summers dissented,
denying the divorce judgment could not be attacked under
Mississippi law-a matter not commented on here-and alleging
further that Johnson v. Muelberger envisioned "adversary pro-
ceedings" and not a mere waiver of citation and entry of appear-
ance as authorized by Mississippi law and employed in this
instance.
If the decision in Boudreaux v. Welch is required by the
United States Supreme Court decisions discussed above, then
the absurdity of pretending that divorce jurisdiction is dependent
on the domicile of the plaintiff is manifest. In that event the
parties must be considered as having succeeded in conferring
divorce jurisdiction on a state which did not have it under the
basic rule as stated in William v. North Carolina I even though
they (or at least their attorneys) must have been fully aware
of the disparity between the law and the facts of their situation.
The decision in Sherrer v. Sherrer was certainly understand-
able, for the issue of domicile had been litigated, and there
must be an end to litigation. Perhaps that in Coe v. Coe was
41. 249 La. 983, 192 So.2d 356 (1966).
42. Boudreaux v. Welch, 180 So.2d 725 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
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understandable for the same reason, for the defendant had at
least, and apparently in good faith, litigated the merits of the
suit if not the jurisdictional fact of domicile.4 8 Nevertheless,
the thrust of Williams v. North Carolina I and II seems to be
that no state is to be denied the exclusive authority to legislate
and to adjudicate on the marital status of its domiciliaries. If
this is so, any procedure by which parties may by collusion or
fraud deprive the plaintiff's state of domicile of the right to
determine his marital status by its own law defeats the pos-
sibility of enforcing the primary rule. If the issue of domicile
may not be raised after the defendant has contested the suit
on its merits while admitting the plaintiff's domicile, as in
Coe v. Coe, then cooperating spouses can choose effectively both
the forum and the law applicable to the suit. This result is
even more easily attainable if the defendant need not contest
the suit at all after personal service at the forum, as in Johnson v.
Muelberger, and is ridiculously easy of attainment if a "waiver
of citation and entry of appearance," as in Boudreaux v. Welch,
will suffice as much as personal service or appearance and
contest on the merits. It is true that the rule of Williams v.
North Carolina I and II continues to be applied in ex parte
divorces, that is to say, when the defendant has not been served
personally and does not cooperate in any way in the proceedings,
but the defendant who wishes can make a mockery of the rule.
This is a most unsatisfactory state of the decisions.
It is to be suspected that the United States Supreme Court
might not have extended its decisions in Sherrer, Coe, Johnson,
and Cook to include the situation in Boudreaux v. Welch. The
last of the aforementioned decisions was rendered in 1951, and
it would appear that the decision in Granville-Smith v. Gran-
ville-Smith,44 rendered in 1955, affirms the principle that the
requirement of the plaintiff's domicile at the forum may not
be circumvented. The particular suit involved the validity of
Virgin Islands legislation (1) presuming the plaintiff to be
domiciled in the Virgin Islands if he or she had resided there
six weeks and (2) declaring domicile immaterial to jurisdic-
tion if both spouses were before the court personally. The
United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule of Williams v.
43. The decision in Biri v. Biri, 192 So.2d 862 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), is
consistent with Coe v. Coe.
44. 349 U.S. 1 (1955).
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North Carolina I and proceeded to declare the Virgin Islands
legislation invalid on the ground that the congressional legisla-
tion from which the Virgin Islands legislature derived its author-
ity did not authorize it to enact laws which the states them-
selves were powerless to enact. If the Supreme Court will not
permit the states and territories to vary the jurisdictional basis
for divorce, it would seem logical to expect it would not tolerate
the spouses doing so through misuse of the rule of res judicata.
A related question was presented in Turpin v. Turpin.45
The wife, domiciled in Louisiana, sued for divorce in Arkansas,
apparently in ex parte proceedings. The next day she married
her second husband and nearly two years later her first husband
married his second wife. Later, apparently believing her Ark-
ansas divorce a nullity, the wife filed suit in Louisiana, her
domicile, for divorce from her first husband. The first husband
pleaded "res judicata." The court of appeal sustained the excep-
tion as one of estoppel, reasoning pragmatically that both the
wife and her first husband had relied on the divorce judgment
by remarrying and to declare the divorce invalid would violate
"considerations of common decency." Contrary to Turpin is the
decision in Clark v. Clark46 rendered by the Court of Appeal
for the Third Circuit. Parties then married to other persons both
proceeded to obtain ex parte divorces from their respective
spouses in suits filed in Mexico. Judge Frug6 first held that if
ex parte sister-state divorces are not entitled to full faith and
credit, then certainly ex parte foreign divorces should not be
recognized, and then proceeded to refuse to apply estoppel to
deny the validity of the divorces.
The decision in Clark is much more reasonable, and much
more consistent with the principles of Louisiana law than the
decision in Turpin. Divorce jurisdiction is a matter of public
order, against which the parties may not be allowed to pre-
vail through their own connivance. Each state has the constitu-
tional right to determine for itself and according to its own
law the marital status of its domiciliaries. To refuse to permit
the parties or others on any grounds to assert the nullity of a
divorce is to aid those who would circumvent the law to do so,
45. 186 So.2d 650 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966), unit dented, 187 So.2d 741, on
the basis the judgment was correct.
46. 192 So.2d 594 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
to create jurisdiction where none exists. A much sounder prin-
ciple is implicit in article 113 of the Civil Code, according to
which an absolutely null marriage may be attacked by the
parties, the attorney general, or any interested party.
PROPERTY
Frederick W. Ellis*
In Jeanerette Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Board of Commis-
sioners,' the Supreme Court held that the article 665 levee servi-
tude did not affect land not presently fronting on a navigable
river and not part of an original riparian grant. There is no
necessity to reiterate commentary which fully supports the
decision.2 Because the original justification for the servitude has
been substantially eroded, it is hoped that in resolving remaining
questions, the court will continue to apply article 665 restric-
tively.
Wild v. LeBlanc is an interesting decision, also discussed
fully elsewhere, 4 on the problem of continuous servitude. In
accordance with prior rice country jurisprudence,5 the court
held that irrigation drainage rights constituted a continuous
servitude which could be acquired by ten-year prescription,
even though acts of man to exercise the drainage took place
off the servient estate. While resort to French writings about
flushing commodes in Paris might furnish reasons to criticize
the Louisiana jurisprudence recognizing that the necessity of
acts off the servient estate do not render a servitude discontinu-
ous, the practical need for protecting long-established drainage
systems in Louisiana lowlands furnishes more serious reason
to support the opinion. These needs were probably as much
in the minds of the redactors of our Code in 1825 as they un-
doubtedly are in the minds of our judges today.
State v. Thompson," an expropriation decision, considered
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Faculty
Editor, Louisiana Law Review.
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in Taking Without Just Compensation, 40 TUL. L. REV. 233 (1966); Note, 27
LA. L. REV. 321 (1967).
3. 191 So.2d 146 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
4. Note, 28 LA. L. REV. 134 (1967).
5. Discussed at 191 So.2d 146, 148 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
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